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The finding that some firms pay lower actual or effective tax than others has
been a source of concern in the US (Citizens for Tax Justice, 1984, 1985, 1986;
Wilkie and Limberg, 1990; Kern and Morris, 1992; McIntyre and Nguyen,
2000). The main reason for this is that the difference in effective tax rates
(ETR hereafter) between firms runs contrary to the notion of tax equity in
Western capitalisms (Hagan and Larkins, 1992).2 This notion of tax equity is
also responsible for the firm size explanation adopted in current ETR
research.3 However, there are reasons to suggest that firm size alone may not
be sufficiently useful as an explanation in understanding the largely unexplored
issue of ETR determinants of non-western firms.4
A major difference between developed capitalisms in the West (e.g., in North
America) and non-western developing capitalisms (e.g., in East Asia) is that the
latter tend to be ‘‘relationship-based’’ or ‘‘crony’’ rather than ‘‘market-based’’
capitalisms (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2003). The multi-faceted relation
between business and politics in East Asia attests to this notion of ‘‘relation-
ship-based’’ capitalism (Gomez and Jomo, 1997, 1998; Gomez, 2002). The
Malaysian government, for example, plays the role of political patron to
selected firms, which have been referred to as firms with political connections
(Perkins and Woo, 2000; Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003).
Some researchers (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2003) argue that capitalism in
its initial developing stage tends to be ‘‘relationship-based’’ (with political con-
nections being an important form of relationship) and that, as the economy
develops, it transforms itself from ‘‘relationship-based’’ to ‘‘market-based.’’
The notion of ‘‘relationship-based’’ capitalism suggests that the political con-
nections explanation may complement the firm size explanation in understand-
ing ETR in developing economies.
Research concerning the importance of political connections as a determi-
nant of ETR is important for several reasons. Very little is currently known
about the determinants of ETR in relationship-based economies. Yet the eco-
nomic importance of countries with relationship-based economies has
increased substantially and their significance is likely to grow even more in
coming decades. It is, therefore, important that current research be expanded
to capture the complexities of ETR and its determinants in relationship-based
economies. Such research, while certainly worthwhile by itself, may also pro-
vide insights into the forces that shape ETR in Western countries. Moreover,Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=996072
2 Tax equity requires that all firms pay the same amount of effective tax.
3 Large firms pay more effective tax due to higher ‘‘political cost’’ (e.g., Zimmerman, 1983) or
large firms pay less effective tax due to stronger ‘‘political clout’’ (e.g., Porcano, 1986).
4 With the exception of Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) and Derashid and Zhang (2003), there are
no studies examining ETR of non-western firms.
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political connections from studies of ETR may lead to unreliable results, espe-
cially for ‘‘relationship-based’’ economies. If firms with political connections
should have a different effective tax rate, this must be taken into account when
relative firm performance (e.g., between politically connected firms and other
firms) is assessed. Finally, the possible link between ETR and political connec-
tions has not been sufficiently explored.5
This paper contributes to the currently scarce ETR literature on non-wes-
tern firms by exploring the link between political connections and ETR in
Malaysia.6 We first examine factors that may account for the policy and per-
sonal dimensions of political connections based on an institutional assessment
of Malaysia. We also argue that the relevant studies in this area (i.e., Kim and
Limpaphayom (1998); Derashid and Zhang (2003)) may not capture all the
important aspects of public policy. Based on our analysis, we hypothesize that
firms with political connections pay tax at lower effective rates. Two proxies of
political connections are developed. Finally, we study the link between ETR
and political connections based on a group of Malaysian firms over a 10-year
period.
We find that firms with political connections pay tax at significantly lower
effective rates in Malaysia. Our results suggest that political connections are
an important determinant of ETR in ‘‘relationship-based’’ economies. Our evi-
dence is longitudinal and is adjusted for firm-specific and time-specific effects in
addition to size and sector effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next two sections provide
a review of prior research on ETR and a discussion of the Malaysian context.
The following section outlines the research design and data. Empirical results
are then reported and explained. Finally, the last section explores the implica-
tions of our findings and concludes.2. Prior research
Prior research on ETR has focused on the neutrality of the corporate tax
system with respect to firms of different size or the firm size explanation (Sal-
amon and Siegfried, 1977; Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986; Wilkie and
Limberg, 1990; Kern and Morris, 1992; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Kim5 The ETR research thus far has been based mainly on US, firms and chiefly (if not exclusively)
concerned with the effective tax burden borne by firms of different size (Salamon and Siegfried,
1977; Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986; Wilkie and Limberg, 1990; Kern and Morris, 1992; Gupta
and Newberry, 1997; McIntyre and Nguyen, 2000).
6 Malaysia is a relevant context for two reasons: (1) it is a ‘‘relationship-based’’ capitalism; (2) the
link between business and politics is close and multi-faceted (Gomez, 2002).
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US firms on the relation between ETR and firm size have produced conflict-
ing results (Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986; Wilkie and Limberg, 1990;
Kern and Morris, 1992; Gupta and Newberry, 1997). While Zimmerman
(1983) observes a positive association between ETR and firm size using a cash
flow based ETR proxy, Porcano (1986) observes a negative association using
an income based ETR proxy. The Gupta and Newberry (1997) study is nota-
ble because it uses more rigorous panel estimation procedures to examine the
longitudinal effects of firm size on ETR within a multi-variate framework.
Interestingly, they find that firm size has no effects on ETR of US firms over
time.
Very little is known about ETR determinants in non-western economies.
In view of the significant institutional differences between developed, ‘‘mar-
ket-based’’ economies (e.g., in North America) and developing, ‘‘relation-
ship-based’’ economies (e.g., in East Asia), one should be cautious about
generalising US-based ETR findings to developing economies. Moreover,
initial non-western evidence also warrants the need for caution. Kim and
Limpaphayom (1998) provide initial evidence that large firms in East Asia
pay tax at significantly lower effective rates. Derashid and Zhang (2003) pro-
vide further evidence that manufacturing firms in Malaysia pay tax at signif-
icantly lower effective rates. Both studies attribute their results to an
economic explanation in the form of the long-standing ‘‘industry policy’’ in
these economies. However, these two studies choose to address the policy
question within the narrower confine of industrialization rather than within
the context of ‘‘relationship-based’’ capitalisms, which also suggests a rela-
tional (or personal) dimension in public policy. Thus, prior research may
not capture all the important aspects of public policy.
Additionally, with the exception of Gupta and Newberry (1997), a poten-
tial methodological problem with extant ETR studies is that the results are
obtained using simply pooled OLS procedures, which cannot account for
firm-specific and time-specific effects and produce potentially biased and
inconsistent results. This problem, however, can be overcome by using longi-
tudinal firm-level data and the panel estimation procedures as carried out in
this study.3. ETR and the Malaysian context
3.1. Political connections
When Malaysia gained independence from Britain in 1957, it was primarily
a producer of two commodities: tin and rubber. In the subsequent years, it has
been the government’s long-standing public policy (known as the industrializa-
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important objective of this policy has been to promote and support Malaysian
firms so as to enable these firms to provide for the domestic economy and even-
tually compete internationally. The industrialization policy continues to be
actively pursued by the Malaysian government. This policy, in part, explains
the link between politics and business in Malaysia and the political connections
between the government and selected firms (e.g., firms deemed compatible with
the industrialization policy).
In 1969 (after the ethnic riot), the Malaysian government also began to
address the social-economic imbalance between the three ethnic groups in
the country: Malays (known as Bumiputeras), Chinese, and Indians. As a mat-
ter of continuing public policy, the government promotes and supports Bum-
iputera ownership and participation in the corporate sector of Malaysia.8
One result is that Bumiputera firms are given various forms of support ranging
from financing to investment opportunities (Gomez and Jomo, 1998). The pol-
icy to support Bumiputera firms forms an important link between politics and
business in Malaysia.
While the above discussion uncovers a public policy dimension of political
connections, political connections are likely to be multi-dimensional. In the
context of a ‘‘relationship-based’’ capitalism, it is logical for political connec-
tions to have a personal dimension based on, for example, informal ties
between firms and politicians. However, these informal ties should (at least
partially) facilitate the implementations of public policies or it would be diffi-
cult for them to be sustained long enough to take on political significance
and be documented (Gomez and Jomo, 1997).
In other words, the policy dimension of political connections overlaps with
its personal dimension in Malaysia. Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia
(listed as Hicom in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) is a good illustration of
this overlap (Gomez and Jomo, 1998). Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minis-
ter of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003, personally helped set up Hicom (a Bumipu-
tera controlled firm and one of the largest manufacturing firms in Malaysia)
when he was the finance minister in 1980. The Department of Finance of
Malaysia provided significant resources to finance Hicom. Dr. Mahathir,
who had remained close to Hicom, is also President of UMNO (United
Malays’ National Organization), a powerful advocate of Bumiputera capital-
ism and a dominant member of Barisan National, the ruling coalition in
Malaysia for the last 30 years.
Thus, as part of the public policy in relationship-based economies, govern-
ment privileges are provided to selected firms for overlapping policy and per-7 See, for example, Alavi (1996) for a detailed discussion.
8 See, for example, Gomez and Jomo (1998) for a detailed discussion.
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These can include special tax deductions and tax-free government bailouts
(e.g., Jayasankaran, 1999), all of which result in a lower effective rate.9 Given
that some privileges/subsidies may result in a different ETR for firms with
political connections, the possible impact of political connections on ETR is
an important and so far yet to be examined issue. We hypothesize that politi-
cally connected firms pay tax at lower effective rates:
Hypothesis. Ceteris paribus, firms with political connections pay tax at lower
effective rates (i.e., corporate effective tax rates in Malaysia are negatively
related to political connections).
4. Research design
4.1. Sample
The sample data used in this paper is a balanced panel hand-gathered from
1990–1999 annual reports published by firms listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange (KLSE). This method of data gathering, while laborious, has at least
three benefits. First, the KLSE requires all its listed firms to abide by the KLSE
listing requirements. Paragraph 9.26 of the listing requirements states that all
listed firms should prepare their annual audited accounts in accordance with
standards approved by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB)
and the 9th Schedule of the 1965 Malaysian Companies Act.10 Thus, one can
be reasonably confident that the accounting figures from the sample are consis-
tent with accounting standards. Second, the KLSE requires all its listed firms to
abide by its disclosure standards, which include the requirement that data
filed with the KLSE must be certified by qualified auditors and made publicly9 However, to identify the exact mechanisms by which political connections translates into ETR is
difficult and beyond the scope of this study. While politically connected firms enjoy government
privileges (e.g., tax subsidies and government investment) that may help lower their ETR, such
concessions are often quite discretionary and disclosure about them is quite limited. There are
various discretionary tax breaks which can lead to lower ETR for selected firms. These tax breaks
are often in the form of tax shields such as allowances, non-taxable income and special deductions.
One well-known example of non-taxable income or subsidy is the substantial government cash
injection to the financially distressed Proton, the national car company. Another example is the tax
deduction provided for some activities (e.g., selected training schemes). Yet another example is the
tax-deductions available to approved hotel operators to promote convention trade. However, it is
difficult to systematically document and isolate such government privileges because most of these are
granted as concession at the discretion of the Malaysian authorities and disclosure is not mandatory.
10 MASB has developed Malaysian Accounting Standard (MAS) as well as adopted extant
International Accounting Standards (IAS).
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information in this data set is consistent in quality. Finally, KLSE classifies
listed firms into sectors based on core business. Thus, this data set enables the
adjustment of sector effects.
For the time period covered (1990–1999), all listed firms were included in the
original sample. There were 474 firms in the original sample. These firms were
classified into nine different sectors according to their core business: consumer,
manufacturing, mining, finance, construction, trading/services, hotels, planta-
tions, and properties. The original sample was reduced by the following
exclusions:
(1) Firms for which we have incomplete information. 65 firms fall into this
category.
(2) Firms with net operating loss (NOL) carry-forwards. These firms are
excluded because they would introduce confounding effects and the
results would be difficult to interpret. Their exclusion is also consistent
with previous studies (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Gupta and New-
berry, 1997; Wilkie and Limberg, 1990). 101 firms fall into this category.
(3) Firms whose effective tax rate exceeds one. This exclusion is consistent
with previous studies (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Zimmerman, 1983;
Singh et al., 1987; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Kim and Limpaphayom,
1998). The effective tax rate of a firm may be greater than one for a num-
ber of reasons. One reason is that in the process of consolidation within a
group of firms, subsidiaries/associated firms with net operating profits are
combined with those subsidiaries/associated firms with net operating
losses. Another reason is that tax expense on an asset sold in a prior year
at a gain is recognized in the current period and has the effect of distort-
ing the numerator of the effective tax rate but not the denominator (Zim-
merman, 1983). 51 firms fall into this category.
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure which ensures
that each firm included in the sample is a firm listed on the KLSE in 1990 and
continues trading as a sole concern up to 1999. Our sample of a balanced panel
comes to 257 firms for 10 consecutive years (2570 firm years). Panel B of
Table 1 provides the sector distribution of the sample. A majority of the firms,
98 (38%), are from the manufacturing sector followed by the property, 41
(16%), and the plantation sector, 39 (15%), respectively. This is consistent with
the Malaysian government policy to promote the manufacturing sector.
Another measurement issue concerns firms which report either negative
income (negative denominator) or tax refunds (negative numerator). Following
Gupta and Newberry (1997), we retain these firms in the sample. However,
their ETRs are distorted in certain situations. One example is a firm with a
book loss (negative denominator) and tax refund (negative numerator) because
Table 1
Sample selection (panel A) and sector distribution of the sample (panel B)
Panel A
All firms listed on the KLSE in 1999 474
Less
Firms missing data for one or more of the panel years 65
Firms with net operating loss carry-forward 101
Firms with ETR more than one 51
Final sample (number of firms) 257
Final Sample (firm years) 2570
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example is a firm that paid taxes (positive numerator) but reported a book loss
(negative denominator) because the ETR for this firm would be negative even
though it paid taxes. To address this problem, we use the recoding scheme pro-
posed by Gupta and Newberry (1997) by setting the ETR: (1) to zero for firms
with tax refunds; and (2) to one for firms with positive taxes and negative/zero
income or cash flow.
4.2. Regression model and variable definition
We use a regression model of the following general form:
ETRit ¼ aþ b1POLCONit þ b2SIZEit þ b3LEVit þ b4CAPINTit
þ b5INVINTit þ b6ROAit þ b7MKBKit þ b Sector Effects
The dependent variable, ETRit, is the average effective tax rate for firm i in year
t. The independent variables include proxies for political connections (POL-
CON), firm size (SIZE), capital structure (LEV), asset mix (CAPINT and IN-
VINT), firm performance (ROA), growth prospects (MTBK), and sector
dummies (Sector Effects). The definitions of these variables are discussed below.
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It has been suggested that there are two issues in the selection of ETR
measures (Callihan, 1994; Omer and Molloy, 1991). These issues are related
to which taxes to consider and how profit should be measured. To be con-
sistent with previous studies, we use only the current portion of a firm’s
income and exclude the deferred portion (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998;
Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Porcano, 1986). The issue of how profit should
be measured arises because of the difference between accounting (book)
income and tax income. This difference suggests that accounting profit might
not represent the actual chargeable income of the firms. In addition, differ-
ent accounting policies adopted by firms would result in different incomes.
The accounting policy induced income difference would render financial
information incomparable across firms. According to Zimmerman (1983),
the use of cash flow (rather than operating income) would eliminate the
effects of different accounting treatments on income. A number of subse-
quent researchers have also used cash flow from operations as an alternative
to operating income to calculate ETR (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Singh
et al., 1987).
To account for the factors discussed above, we include two different ETR
measures in our study. ETRI is the measure used by Porcano (1986): (Tax
expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Profit before interest and tax). ETRC is
the measure used by Zimmerman (1983): (Tax expenses  Deferred tax
expenses)/(Operating cash flow).
4.2.2. Explanatory variables
Fig. 1 models the mechanisms through which political connections influence
ETR in a relationship-based economy such as Malaysia. The model suggests
that political connections in a relationship-based economy are multi-faceted
consisting of public policy and personal factors. Political connections in such







Fig. 1. Linking dimensions of political connections to ETR in a relationship-based economy.
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industrialization policy. Another reason may be that the firm has substantial
Bumiputera participation and therefore deserving of government involvement.
Yet another reason may well be the ties developed between the firms and lead-
ing politicians. Thus, several dimensions (economic, social, and personal) may
explain government support in a firm as the Hicom case illustrates. Our model
also suggests that political connections may also be the result of informal ties
beyond that captured by public policy factors.
We use two proxies of political connections (POLCON). The first proxy
(POLCON1) is the percentage of government ownership in a firm. This is a
proxy for government support. Although direct equity ownership may not
be the only mechanism through which government supports selected firms, it
is a reasonable proxy and the best we can do. Government ownership of firms
is also something not observed in any of the US based studies and thus not
examined before. However, it is a long established practice in Malaysia and
other developing countries. POLCON1 is a continuous variable reflecting the
changing level of political connections at a point in time.
For robustness, we also use a second proxy of political connections
(POLCON2), based on the proxy used by Johnson and Mitton (2003). This
proxy of political connections is based on whether or not a firm’s directors
or major shareholders have informal ties with leading politicians through
chance personal encounters. Following Johnson and Mitton (2003), we rely
on the analysis of Gomez and Jomo (1998) to identify firms politically con-
nected with leading politicians. Gomez and Jomo (1998) provide a detailed
analysis of Malaysian corporations and their political connections.11 There
is no doubt that a personal dimension exists in these informal ties and that
this personal dimension may well be responsible for initiating these ties in
the first place. However, this proxy may contain overlapping policy and per-
sonal dimensions since these informal ties are not likely to be sustained in
the long-run without policy considerations. The proxy is a dummy variable
equal to one, if the firm’s directors or major shareholders have close rela-
tionships with a leading politician in Malaysia, zero otherwise. We expect
a negative relation between ETR (corporate effective rate) and POLCON2
(political connections).
Because policy and personal dimensions may well overlap in a relationship-
based economy, POLCON1 and POLCON2 both function as alternative
proxies for political connections. However, they do not contain all elements11 One drawback of the Gomez and Jomo (1998) list is that they do not claim to have exhaustively
identified all firms in Malaysia with political connections. The subset of firms identified by the
authors, however, must be those firms with the strongest political connections (Johnson and
Mitton, 2003). Thus, in our sample, the number of politically connected firms drops from 167 firms
for POLCON1 to 41 firms for POLCON2.
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broadly captures the economic (industrialization), the social (Bumiputera
capitalism), and the personal (informal ties) dimension present in a relation-
ship-based economy, while POLCON2 is more focused on the personal (infor-
mal ties). As such, POLCON1 is likely to have more and broader policy
content than POLCON2.
In addition to POLCON, we include a number of variables (all of which
are used in previous ETR studies) to control for other effects. SIZE, the nat-
ural log of total asset value, is used as the proxy for size effects.12 Since large
firms in relationship-based economies pay tax at lower effective rates due to
economic or ‘‘industrialization’’ reasons (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998;
Derashid and Zhang, 2003), we would expect to see a negative relation
between ETR and firm size in Malaysia even after we account for the per-
sonal dimensions of public policy captured by the political connections proxy.
Financial leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets (both book
values). Capital intensity (CAPINT) is the ratio of net property, plant, and
equipment to total assets. Previous studies (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Por-
cano, 1986; Stickney and McGee, 1982) all suggest that LEV and CAPINT
are negatively related to ETR. LEV is negatively related to ETR because
of tax-deductible interest payments and CAPINT is negatively related to
ETR because of accelerated depreciation charges relative to asset lives.
INVINT, the ratio of inventory to total assets (both at book values), is also
included in the model. Gupta and Newberry (1997) argue that given the tax
benefits associated with capital investments, capital intensive firms should
face lower ETR and to the extent that INVINT is a substitute for CAPINT,
inventory intensive firms should face relatively higher ETR. They find a sig-
nificant and positive relationship between INVINT and ETR. We also
include a profitability proxy, ROA (return on assets) and a growth proxy,
MKBV (Market-to-book ratio) in our analysis (e.g., Spooner, 1986; Kim
and Limpaphayom, 1998).
Sector Effects is a vector of dummy variables denoting the different sectors
to which the firms in the sample belong. The sector dummies are: consumer,
manufacturing, mining, finance, construction, trading/services, and hotel and
plantation (with properties being the omitted sector). Since one important
objective of the industrialization policy in Malaysia has been to promote and
support the manufacturing sector, previous work (Derashid and Zhang,
2003) also suggests that the relation between ETR and the manufacturing sec-
tor is likely to be negative.12 Some concerns have been raised (e.g., Ball and Foster, 1982) that this proxy for size may also be
capturing other effects. For reasons of robustness, we also used an alternative size proxy, the
number of subsidiaries. The results we obtained are qualitatively similar.
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Estimates obtained using panel data estimation procedures have a number
of advantages over the simply pooled OLS procedures (Hsiao, 1989; Slemrod
and Shobe, 1990). Specifically, simple pooled estimation procedures cannot
adjust firm-specific and time-specific effects which may result in an omitted var-
iable bias and a mis-specified model. Thus, the problems are potentially seri-
ous. The fixed-effects model (FEM) overcomes this problem by adjusting for
individual firm effects through the firm-specific and time-specific intercepts in
the model. These intercepts can capture unobserved and/or immeasurable
firm-specific and time-specific characteristics. Alternatively, the problem of
omitting firm-specific effects can be overcome by the random-effects model
(REM), which assumes that the firm-specific and time-specific characteristics
are randomly generated from a normal distribution and are uncorrelated with
other regressors in the model. Various statistical tests can be used to determine
which model (simply pooled, FEM, REM) produces the most adequate speci-
fications. In this paper, we estimated all three models and selected the appro-
priate model based on statistical tests.5. Results
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (ETRC and
ETRI) and selected explanatory variables over the period 1990–1999. On the
whole, examination of the data suggests no obvious outliers. ETRC has a mean
of 0.2297 and a median of 0.2358. ETRI has a mean of 0.2662 and a median of
0.3485. Given that cash flows are generally larger than book income, ETRC is
on average smaller than ETRI as expected.
Table 3 provides a breakdown between politically connected versus uncon-
nected firms using the proxies for political connections, POLCON2, and a
modified version of POLCON1. The modified variable (MPOLCON1), a
dummy variable equal to one if a firm has government ownership and zero
otherwise, is for descriptive purposes only, for all other tests we use a contin-
uous variable for POLCON1. Politically connected firms have significantly
lower ETR than unconnected firms irrespective of how ETR or political con-
nection is defined. Additionally, politically connected firms are larger and
more highly leveraged compared to politically unconnected firms. There
are, however, no significant differences in terms of profitability and the
amount of inventory firms carry between politically connected and uncon-
nected firms.
Bivariate (Pearson product-moment) correlation among explanatory
variables is presented in Table 4. The low correlation between explanatory vari-
ables suggests that the problem of multi-collinearity is not serious in the data
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of effective tax rates and explanatory variables of Malaysian firms in the 1990–
1999 period
ETRC (n = 257 firms:
2570 firm years)
ETR1 (n = 257 firms:
2570 firm years)
Panel A: Dependent variables
Mean 0.2297 0.2662
Median 0.2358 0.3485
Standard deviation 0.2827 0.2246
POLCON1 POLCON2
Panel B: Political connection proxies
N 2570 2570
Value = 1 16%




SIZE LEV MKBV CAPINT ROA INVINT
Panel C: Other explanatory variables (n = 257 firms: 2570 firm years)
Mean 13.0207 0.1466 2.9590 0.2356 0.0809 0.1226
Median 13.0458 0.1675 1.9296 0.1676 0.0742 0.0938
Standard Deviation 1.6266 0.2516 11.3738 0.3328 0.2265 0.1239
Note: ETRC = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Operating cash flows); ETRI = (Tax
expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Profit before interest and tax); POLCON1 = Percentage of
government equity ownership; POLCON2 = 1 if the firm is connected with top politicians; 0
otherwise; SIZE = Natural log of total assets; LEV = (Total debt)/(Total assets);
CAPINT = (Property, plant and equipment)/(Total assets); INVINT = (Inventory/Total assets);
ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets); MKBV = (Market price of share)/(Shareholders equity/
Number of ordinary shares outstanding).
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correlated with each of the two ETR measures consistent with our main
hypothesis. Overall, the univariate results reported in Tables 3 and 4 suggest
that politically connected firms enjoy lower effective tax rates.5.1. Regression results
We obtain estimates from all three models: simple-pooled regression model
(OLS), fixed-effects model (FEM), and random-effects model (REM). We run
three tests to determine the most appropriate model to use (see e.g., Gupta and
Newberry, 1997; Green, 1993). The Likelihood Ratio Test suggests FEM out-
performs simply pooled OLS at the 99% confidence level. The Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) test suggests that REM outperforms simply pooled at the
99% confidence level. The Hausman Chi Square Test suggests that REM
Table 3










Number of observations 2570 1670 900 410 2340
ETR
ETRC 0.2297 0.2085 0.2376 2.264*** 0.1904 0.2347 2.225***
ETRI 0.2662 0.2335 0.2864 2.537*** 0.2412 0.2785 2.246***
Control
SIZE 13.0207 13.294 12.489 12.298*** 13.703 12.897 9.169***
LEV 0.1446 0.1512 0.1374 12.267*** 0.2054 0.1359 5.902***
MKBV 2.9590 2.3673 4.1279 3.811*** 4.5083 2.6776 3.022***
CAPINT 0.2356 0.2323 0.1858 6.555*** 0.2120 0.2431 3.257***
ROA 0.0809 0.0780 0.0803 1.601 0.0783 0.0825 1.550
INVINT 0.1226 0.1329 0.1189 1.273 0.1031 0.1342 1.472
Variable definitions: ETRC = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Operating cash flows); ETRI = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Profit
before interest and tax); MPOLCON1 = 1 if government equity ownership is positive; 0 otherwise; POLCON2 = 1 if the firm is connected with top
politicians; 0 otherwise; SIZE = Natural log of total assets; LEV = (Total debt)/(Total assets); CAPINT = (Property, plant and equipment)/(Total
assets); INVINT = (Inventory/Total assets); ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets); MKBV = (Market price of share)/(Shareholders equity/Number
of ordinary shares outstanding).






















































Pearson pairwise correlations among the dependent and explanatory variables
ETRC ETRI CAPINT LEV SIZE POLCON1 POLCON2 MKBV INVINT ROA
ETRC 1
ETRI 0.031* 1
CAPINT 0.033** 0.044** 1
LEV 0.051* 0.021 0.041** 1
SIZE 0.124 0.190 0.163** 0.337** 1
POLCON1 0.023** 0.047** 0.129 0.031** 0.146** 1
POLCON2 0.011* 0.044* 0.064 0.116 0.179** 0.138** 1
MKBV 0.045 0.036 0.051 0.035 0.077** 0.130 0.026 1
INVINT 0.020 0.014 0.067** 0.128** 0.195** 0.193** 0.005 0.041 1
ROA 0.073* 0.047* 0.067** 0.038 0.073 0.049 0.012 0.053 0.019 1
Variable definitions: ETRC = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Operating cash flows); ETRI = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Profit
before interest and tax); POLCON1 = Percentage of government equity ownership; POLCON2 = 1 if the firm is connected with top politicians; 0
otherwise; SIZE = Natural log of total assets; LEV = (Total debt)/(Total assets); CAPINT = (Property, plant and equipment)/(Total assets);
INVINT = (Inventory/Total assets); ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets); MKBV = (Market price of share)/(Shareholders equity/Number of
ordinary shares outstanding).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).






















































Two-way random-effects regression results effective tax rates in Malaysia (with government
ownership as the proxy for political connection)
Variables Predicted sign ETRC ETRI
POLCON1  0.0422*** 0.0042**
SIZE  0.0132 0.0125***
LEV  0.0810** 0.0541
CAPINT  0.0401** 0.0205***
INVINT + 0.0279 0.0814
ROA ? 0.1105** 0.1108***
MKBV ? 0.0017 0.0067
Sector Effects
Manufacturing  0.1123 0.1090*
Consumer ? 0.0125 0.0731
Mining ? 0.0603 0.0523
Finance ? 0.0233 0.0630
Construction ? 0.0224 0.0114
Trading ? 0.0250 0.0451
Hotel ? 0.0808 0.1301
Plantations ? 0.0321 0.0871
Observations 2570 2570
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.283
Adusted R2 excluding POLCON1 0.195 0.174
Variable definitions: ETRC = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Operating cash flows);
ETRI = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Profit before interest and tax); SIZE = Natural
log of total assets; POLCON1 = Percentage of government equity ownership; LEV = (Total debt)/
(Total assets); CAPINT = (Property, plant and equipment)/(Total assets); INVINT = (Inventory/
Total assets); ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets); MKBV = (Market price of share)/(Share-
holders equity/Number of ordinary shares outstanding); Sector Effects = sector dummy (consumer,
manufacturing, mining, construction, trading/services, hotel, and plantation, with properties being
the omitted sector).
* Denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
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reported in the paper.
Results from the regression analysis are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5
shows that the coefficient of POLCON1, the political connections proxy, is
negative and highly significant in both ETRC and ETRI regressions. There
is strong evidence to suggest that Malaysian firms with political connections
(when measured as percentage of government equity ownership) pay signifi-
cantly lower effective tax. This result is the first and potentially significant
result to point to the importance of political connections: (1) in relation to
implementing public policies and (2) in understanding ETR in Malaysian
and non-western firms. This result is in strong support of our hypothesis. Table
Table 6
Two-way random-effects regression results effective tax rates in Malaysia (with personal connection
as the proxy for political connection)
Variables Predicted sign ETRC ETRI
POLCON2  0.210* 0.249*
SIZE  0.0964 0.0554*
LEV  0.1130 0.1168
CAPINT  0.0424*** 0.1707***
INVINT + 0.0310 0.1001
ROA ? 0.7191*** 0.1414***
MKBV ? 0.0018 0.0047
Sector Effects
Manufacturing  0.6100 0.5600**
Consumer ? 0.0407 0.0374
Mining ? 0.2440 0.2467
Finance ? 0.8930 0.5603
Construction ? 0.2501 0.1979
Trading ? 0.2379 0.1590
Hotel ? 0.5761 0.1420
Plantations ? 0.2330 0.1286
Observations 2570 2570
Adjusted R2 0.231 0.212
Adusted R2 excluding POLCON2 0.195 0.174
Variable definitions: ETRC = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Operating cash flows);
ETRI = (Tax expenses  Deferred tax expenses)/(Profit before interest and tax); SIZE = Natural
log of total assets; POLCON2 = 1 if the firm is connected with top politicians; 0 otherwise;
LEV = (Total debt)/(Total assets); CAPINT = (Property, plant and equipment)/(Total assets);
INVINT = (Inventory/Total assets); ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets); MKBV = (Market
price of share)/(Shareholders equity/Number of ordinary shares outstanding); Sector
Effects = sector dummy (consumer, manufacturing, mining, construction, trading/services, hotel,
and plantation, with properties being the omitted sector).
* Denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
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icant in both ETRI and ETRC regressions. This result also supports our
hypothesis and points to a personal element in the implementation of public
policies in Malaysia.
Results for control variables are largely consistent across the two models
reported in Tables 5 and 6. The coefficient of SIZE is negative in both ETRC
and ETRI regressions. Moreover, the coefficient is statistically significant in the
ETRI regression. Our results suggest that larger Malaysian firms pay signifi-
cantly lower effective tax when effective tax rate is measured as income-based
ETRI. The result on size is consistent with previous studies that have examined
ETR in East and Southeast Asian firms (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Deras-
hid and Zhang, 2003).
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measured by ETRC but negative and not statistically significant when ETR is
measured as ETRI, providing some evidence that Malaysian firms with more
debt pay lower effective tax as expected.13 The coefficient of CAPINT is nega-
tive and statistically significant however ETR is measured, suggesting that
Malaysian firms with more capital investments pay significantly lower effective
tax as expected. Finally, the coefficient of ROA is negative and statistically sig-
nificant, however ETR is measured, suggesting that a profitability measure
should be included in the regression analysis. The coefficients of INVINT
and MKBV are, however, not significantly different from zero.
With the exception of the manufacturing sector, none of the sector dummies
appear to be significantly different from zero. The coefficient of the manufac-
turing sector dummy is negative and statistically significant when ETR is
measured as ETRI but not as ETRC. After adjusting for firm-specific and
time-specific effects and other factors, there is some evidence to suggest that
manufacturing firms in Malaysia pay significantly lower effective tax than other
firms.
Finally, it is worth noting that our results of a significant link between polit-
ical connections and ETR are obtained after adjusting for the effects of the pol-
icy aspects captured by firm size and the manufacturing sector. This evidence
suggests firm size and the manufacturing sector explored in prior research do
not reflect all aspects of public policy within the context of a relationship-based
capitalism. As such our results expand the existing literature, which incom-
pletely demonstrates the role of political connections on ETR.
5.2. Additional robustness tests
We perform several additional procedures to validate our findings. To fur-
ther assess the significance of political connections as a determinant of ETR,
we rerun the regressions excluding the political connections proxies (POL-
CON1 and POLCON2). We find a reduced adjusted R square in all regressions
(Tables 5 and 6). However, the coefficients of other variables (not reported)
stay broadly the same. This result suggests that: (1) the inclusion of the political
connections proxies enhances the explanatory power of the model and (2) other
variables also possess explanatory power. The statistically significant coeffi-
cient of political connections (for both POLCON1 and POLCON2) and the
improvement in adjusted R square from the inclusion of the political connec-
tions variables suggest that political connections as a determinant of ETR
should not be ignored. A test of restriction (i.e., the F-test) also rejects the13 When political connections is measured by POLCON2 (Table 6), the coefficient of LEV is
negative but not statistically significant when ETR is measured by ETRC.
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POLCON2) is equal to zero at the 99% level. This also suggests that political
connections should be included as a determinant of ETR.
We also rerun the regressions including both POLCON1 and POLCON2 at
the same time. The statistical significance of POLCON1 is reduced and POL-
CON2 ceases to be significant. This suggests that POLCON1 appears to be
more reliable in capturing the different elements of political connections. This
finding is consistent with our model which suggests that government support
(POLCON1) incorporates the effects of cronyism (POLCON2) as well as public
policy factors.
To assess the impact of the political connections relative to that of other
variables, we first normalize the variables by subtracting each from its mean
and dividing it by its estimated standard deviation. We then rerun the regres-
sions using normalized variables to obtain standardized coefficients. There is
virtually no difference between the standardized coefficients and non-standard-
ized coefficients as expected. When measured as direct government ownership
(POLCON1), the impact of political connections appears to be larger than that
of size, similar to that of capital intensity, but less than that of leverage and
profitability. When measured as informal ties to politicians (POLCON2), the
impact of political connections appears to be larger than that of other coeffi-
cients except for that of profitability. The evidence suggests that political con-
nections is an important determinant of ETR in Malaysia and its impact on
ETR is as much if not larger than that of firm size, the major determinant
of ETR identified in previous US studies.
A limitation of the POLCON2 proxy is that some of the ‘‘connections’’
identified by Gomez and Jomo (1998) were based on early 1990 information
giving rise to the possibility that some of these connections may have disap-
peared by 1999. Johnson and Mitton (2003, p. 358), argue that given the sta-
bility of the government during this period, this limitation should not be too
troublesome. To test the stability argument and isolate the effect of the Asian
financial crisis in 1997, we subdivide the sample into two sub-samples: 1990–
1996 (before the crisis) and 1998–1999 (after the crisis). The results from the
sub-samples are virtually the same as those from the entire sample and provide
support for the stability argument. The results also confirm that the panel esti-
mation procedure has effectively adjusted for observable and/or immeasurable
year-specific (as well as firm-specific) effects in the entire sample.
As shown in Table 4, Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients suggest that
multi-collinearity is not a problem. However, the correlation between SIZE
and LEV may be considered as relatively large. This is consistent with the gen-
eral evidence found in the finance literature (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995)
that large firms tend to be more leveraged. We re-estimate our regressions
excluding LEV but find no change in the significance of the coefficient of SIZE.
This result suggests that the correlation between SIZE and LEV in our sample
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re-estimate the regressions after excluding a few ‘‘outliers’’ based on the
method suggested by Neter et al. (1990).14 We find that the results, both in
terms of signs and statistical significance, are not materially different. We also
use the winsorization procedure to trim our sample at the 99% level (0.5% at
each end) and we obtain similar results. We also re-estimate the regressions
including NOL carry-forward firms, the results are very similar in coefficient
signs but much weaker in statistical significance as expected. Finally, we re-esti-
mate the regressions excluding recoded ETRs and obtain qualitatively similar
results. Our results are on the whole robust.6. Conclusions
This paper adopts the political connections rather than the firm size explana-
tion to study ETR in Malaysia. This explanation is informed and justified by
the realization that Malaysia is a developing, ‘‘relationship-based’’ capitalism
rather than a developed, ‘‘market-based’’ capitalism. Specifically, we examine
the relation between ETR and political connections based on a group of
Malaysian firms over a 10-year period. We find a statistically significant nega-
tive link between ETR and political connections. Firms with political connec-
tions pay tax at significantly lower effective rates in Malaysia. Our evidence
suggests that political connections are a significant determinant of ETR and
their impact should be accounted for.
More generally, our results are consistent with the well-documented fact
that the Malaysian government supports selected firms for overlapping policy
and personal reasons. The Malaysian results, as a case in point, indicate that
significant differences may exist between firms of developing (i.e., ‘‘relation-
ship-based’’) capitalisms and firms of developed (i.e., ‘‘market-based’’) capi-
talisms in relation to ETR. Finally, our results hold two implications in
relation to public policy. One is that public policy is a byproduct of the
underlying political economy (e.g., a developing capitalism) and should be
understood as such. Another and more general aspect is that public policy
can impinge on accounting issues and thus aid our understanding of account-
ing issues.
A major limitation, which is common to all ETR studies, is that mechanisms
or processes, which are actually responsible for certain firms to pay tax at lower
effective rates than other firms, are not examined. An interesting issue for14 We calculate the hat matrix through which the fitted dependent values can be expressed as linear
combinations of dependent observations. An observation is considered as an outlier if its element
on the hat matrix diagonal is more than twice as large as the mean leverage value (number
regression parameters/number of observations).
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ETR may be achieved. While beyond the scope of the current study, one pos-
sible way forward would be to study how accounting choice is used in Malaysia
and whether there is a material difference in accounting standards between sec-
tors and firms in Malaysia.Acknowledgements
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